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Abstract
A growing literature suggests that nancialization may weaken the
performance of non-nancial corporations and constrain the growth of ag-
gregate demand. This paper evaluates (some of) the claims that have been
made using two alternative approaches (one derived from Skott (1981,
1988, 1989) and one from Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002)) and two di¤er-
ent settings (a labor-constrained setting and a dual-economy setting). All
models are in a structuralist / post Keynesian tradition and pay explicit
attention to nancial stock-ow relations. The results are insensitive to
the precise specication of household saving behavior but depend criti-
cally on the labor market assumptions (labor-constrained vs dual) and
the specication of the investment function (Harrodian vs stagnationist).
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Along with neoliberalism and globalization, nancialization has become a buzz-
word in recent years. The precise denition is not always clear but in a broad
sense the term refers to the increasing role of nancial motives, nancial mar-
kets, nancial actors and nancial institutions in the operation of the domestic
and international economies(Epstein 2005, p. 3). More specically, nancial-
ization has been associated with a number of developments.1 These develop-
ments include shifts in central bank policy toward a near-exclusive focus on price
stability, large increases in nancial ows both internationally and in domestic
nancial markets, improved nancing for households and elements of consump-
tion / credit driven growth, changes in corporate governance and attempts to
align managerial incentives with shareholder interests via stock option plans,
and an increased inuence of nancial institutions and institutional investors.
Financial pressures, it is argued, have induced changes in management strategy
from retain and invest" to downsize and distribute" (Lazonick & OSullivan
(2000, p. 18)) and have a¤ected rmsdividend, new issue and debt nance
policies. In some accounts non-nancial corporations were forced to fund most
of their capital investment externally in the neoliberal era" (Crotty 2005, p. 99).
These various changes associated with nancialization may have implications
for macroeconomic performance. Crotty (2005) has argued that nancialization
weakens non-nancial corporations and constrains the growth of aggregate de-
mand. In a similar vein, Duménil and Lévy (2001) suggest that nancialization
leads to instability and undermines growth and employment. Meanwhile, most
of mainstream economics has been praising the potential benets of nancial
liberalization, and some non-mainstream contributors have also seen nancial-
ization as a spur to growth. Thus, Boyer (2000) has suggested the potential for
nance-led growth regimes as an alternative to the defunct Fordist regime.
Although most of the existing literature on nancialization has been descrip-
tive and empirical, more precise analytical treatments of some of the macroeco-
nomic linkages have been presented by Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001),
Dutt (2005) and Stockhammer (2004, 2006).
According to Aglietta and Breton (2001) [g]rowing nancial liberalization
has profoundly changed the connections between nance and the rest of the
economy". Their analysis, however, is hard to follow, and the formal model does
little to elucidate the mechanisms that could support the claims that are being
made in the paper.2 Boyers (2000) model of nance-led growth basically boils
1Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Blecker (1999), Crotty (2005), Stockhammer (2004, 2006),
Duménil and Lévy (2001), Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001) and Froud et al (2000)
are among the contributions to the growing literature on nancialization. An International
Working Group on Financialisation has also been set up with the aim of bringing together
an interdisciplinary network of researchers and practitioners interested in nancialization
and all the issues around relations between the capital market, rms and households."
(http://www.iwgf.org/Events.htm).
2 It is di¢ cult, for instance, to justify their assumption of an exogenously given and constant
(average) net rate of return (E()). The rms credit constraint, second, is peculiar, as is the
assumption that a risk premium is added to the risk-free interest rate only if the quantity
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down to prot-led / exhilirationist regimes with a prot-wealth-consumption
nexus as a driving force. Given the centrality of this nexus, however, a more
careful modeling of the stock-ow relations and of the e¤ects of nancialization
on wage formation would have been desirable. Boyer, for instance, assumes an
exogenously given, constant q ratio. This constancy assumption with respect
to a key nancial variable seems particularly unsatisfactory in a model that ad-
dresses the e¤ects of nancialization. The mechanism through which an increase
in the protability normgenerates a decline in the wage bill (for given values
of output and the capital stock) is also unclear, as is the determination of the
"protability norm".3
The Stockhammer and Dutt papers do not su¤er from weaknesses of the same
kind. Stockhammers 2004 analysis, however, is partial and his 2006 model is
rudimentary in its treatment of the nancial system; Dutts analysis focuses ex-
clusively on the relaxation of householdscredit constraint and considers neither
capital gains nor rmsnancial decisions and balance sheets.
In this paper we explore the macroeconomic implications of changes in rms
nancial decisions (retention rate, new equity issues, debt nance), animal spir-
its(shifts in the investment function), household nancial behavior (saving and
portfolio decisions), and the level of interest rates. These changes are among
the ones that have been highlighted by the nancialization literature but clearly
make up only a small subset of the issues that have been raised.
Three further limitations should be emphasized at the outset: (i) we limit
ourselves to a closed economy, (ii) the emphasis is on the medium- and long-run
e¤ects with little or no attention to questions of short-run stability, and (iii)
we ignore scal policy altogether and our treatment of monetary policy is kept
almost embarrassingly simple. We limit the analysis in this way partly to keep
it tractable, but also because many of the arguments advanced by the nan-
cialization literature concern the medium- and long-run e¤ects of the changes
in nancial behavior and appear to be unrelated to open-economy complica-
tions or government policy. Thus, our simplications may be justied by the
limited objective of our analysis: to examine the logic underlying some of the
claims that have been made in the nancialization literature. It should be noted,
however, that nancialization may a¤ect the properties of cyclical uctuations,
leading perhaps to an increase in the amplitude of uctuations, and our analy-
sis is clearly incomplete since we ignore these medium- and long-run e¤ects on
constraint is binding. This problem has implications for the analysis of the rms optimization
problem. In this analysis, the crucial rst order condition with respect to the debt ratio d
overlooks the dependence of the interest rate r on the debt ratio. Intuitively, why would
any rm ever want to choose d = dmax if by reducing its debt ratio marginally the interest
rate on its debt drops by a nite amount? The calculation of solutions for r and dmax in
the constrained regime is also wrong since it overlooks the fact that the default probability
is itself a function of r (aside from this important point, the expressions for r and dmax also
contain a minor error).
3 Is this norm xed without any feedback from actual prot rates? On p. 124 it is suggested
that, as an extension, the norm could be determined using an adaptive process taking into
account the past record of the achieved rate of prot", but this extension is not pursued in
the paper and it would seem to undermine the exogenous nancializationargument.
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the higher moments of the variables. A more radical perspective, nally, may
regard increasing nancialization as merely a phase in a long cycle of endoge-
nous changes in nancial behavior and Minskian fragility. From this Minskian
perspective our neglect of the dynamic interactions underlying the observed
changes in nancial behavior represents a major limitation.4
Two di¤erent settings are examined. The economy may be mature in
Kaldors (1966) terminology and have a growth rate that is constrained by
the available labor force. Alternatively, in the dual-economysetting, the labor
supply to the modern / capitalist sector of the economy is perfectly elastic. Both
of these settings are analyzed using two alternative models: one is derived from
Skott (1981, 1988, 1989) and the other from Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002).
Both of the models are in a broadly structuralist/ post Keynesian tradition and
both pay explicit attention to balance sheets and nancial stock-ow relations.
The two models di¤er in a number of respects. Interestingly, however, the di¤er-
ences with respect to the specication of nancing, saving and portfolio decisions
have little e¤ect on the qualitative results. By contrast, the e¤ects of nancial-
ization depend critically on the labor market assumptions (labor-constrained vs
dual) and the specication of the investment function (Harrodian vs Kaleckian).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss some
of the stylized facts relating to nancialization and comment on the dangers of a
purely partial analysis. Section 3 outlines our general framework, and Sections
4 and 5 consider the implications of changes in key nancial variables in the
context of the di¤erent models. Section 6, nally, discusses the main results
and o¤ers a few concluding comments and suggestions for further research.
2 Evidence
2.1 Some stylized facts
The stylized facts are largely well-known, and we conne ourselves to a brief
description of some US data. The retention rate, rst, has declined from around
85% in the 1970s to about 73% (Figure 1). It is worth pointing out that this
change marks a return to retention rates that are at or below the levels of the
1950s. Looking at the whole period since 1950, the aberration may have been
the high retention rates of the 1970s and 1980s.
The behavior of non-nancial corporations with respect to new equity issues
shows a clearer picture. Whether measured in terms of the value of new issues
divided by the market value of outstanding equities (Figure 2) or, alternatively,
by the share of new investment nanced by new equity (Figure 3), there has
been a signicant decline in new issues. In the 1950s-1970s a small positive
fraction of gross investment - on average about 5 percent - was nanced by new
issues. Since 1980, however, the rate of net issues has been negative in most
4Minskian models of endogenous movements in nancial fragility have been presented by,
among others, Taylor and OConnell (1986), Lavoie (1986/87), Delli Gati and Gallegati (1990),
Semmler (1987), Skott (1994).
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years, and on average non-nancial corporations have spent an amount equal to
about 12 percent of their gross xed investment to buy back equity.
Debt nance has become increasingly important. As shown in Figure 4,
the ratio of debt to the replacement value of capital has increased from a level
just above 30 percent in the 1950s to about 60 percent. The ratio increased
steadily in the 1950s and 1960s reaching about 50 percent in the early 1970s
before dropping back to about 35 percent around 1980. Thus, the increase has
been very steep over the last 25 years. It should be noted, however, that Figure
4 depicts gross debt. Insofar as non-nancial rms hold increasing amounts of
nancial assets, the movements in net debt could be very di¤erent. Data issues
make it di¢ cult to get a clear picture of changes in net debt.
Real rates of interest have uctuated substantially (Figure 5). The early
1980s saw historically very high interest rate, but rates gradually decrease in
the late 1980s and early 1990s and, after another increase in the mid 1990s, are
now at, and in some cases below, their historical average. Thus, there is little
support for common view that nancialization has led to persistently high real
rates of interest.
Turning now to household behavior, the well-known rise in the ratio of per-
sonal consumption to disposable personal income comes out clearly in Figure
6. The ratio of householdsnet nancial wealth to disposable income, however,
has shown much more stability (Figure 7). The stock market boom of the 1990s
shows up in this ratio, but the value of the ratio is now back at the level that
characterized the golden age" of the 1950s and 1960s. The e¤ects of stock
market uctuations, nally, show up strongly in the ratio of capital gains to
disposable income in Figure 8. The distribution of these gains has been very
unequal, but as an average for the household sector the capital gains (and losses)
on nancial assets have been very signicant in some periods.
2.2 Dangers of a partial analysis
While the stylized facts of changes in nancial variables are (relatively) clear,
the interpretation and importance of these changes for the performance of the
economy may not be obvious, and many of the arguments that have been ad-
vanced by the nancialization literature have a partial avor. As a case in
point we may consider Stockhammer (2004). This paper, with its combination
of theoretical argument and econometric work, presents a clear and interesting
analysis. The partial nature of the analysis, however, is a limitation.
Financialization, Stockhammer argues, has generated a shift in rmsbe-
havior from growth objectives toward shareholder interests. He formalizes this
argument by assuming that the representative rm faces a growth-prot trade-
o¤. Managers pick some point on this g  r frontier, and an increased emphasis
on shareholder interests (partly because of increased takeover threats and partly
because of changes in managerial pay structures) moves the optimal position in
the direction of higher prot rates and lower growth.
The macroeconomic implications of this microeconomic analysis are not as
straightforward as they may seem. Stockhammer does not specify rmsnance
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constraint or discuss rmsnancing decisions in any detail. Presumably, how-
ever, the movements along a g   r frontier must be reected - via the nance
constraint - in changes in retention rates, external nance or the rate of new
share issues. The changes in investment and rmsnancial decisions interact
with household and government behavior, and these macroeconomic interac-
tions - equilibrium conditions for nancial and goods markets - are ignored in
the analysis. Putting it di¤erently, an individual rm may face a perceived g r
tradeo¤ but this perceived tradeo¤ does not extend to the macroeconomic level:
changes in accumulation and nancial behavior a¤ect aggregate demand and
thereby the position of the g   r frontier. Thus, the micro tradeo¤ may not be
stable.
Stockhammer tests the theory by estimating an investment function that
includes rentiersshare of the non-nancial business sector" as an explanatory
variable. It is unclear, however, how one should interpret the results. One might
have thought, rst, that a shift in rmsaccumulation behavior would imply
changes in the parameters of the investment function. Stockhammer does not
consider this possibility. Instead, he argues, the behavioral shift is captured by
an increase in the rentiersshare", and a negative coe¢ cient on this variable is
seen as lending support to the theoretical argument. Even assuming, however,
that an increase in the rentiers share" captures nancial implications of a
behavioral shift, a negative coe¢ cient on this variable in the empirical work
does not necessarily imply that the changes in nancial behavior have had a
negative e¤ect on accumulation.5 Aggregate demand and thereby the values
of other explanatory variables in the regression may have been a¤ected by the
changes in nancial behavior, and these indirect e¤ects need to be taken into
account.
Unlike in the 2004 paper, the macroeconomic dimension of shareholder-
induced shifts in rmsinvestment behavior is analyzed by Stockhammer (2006)
but this happens in a setting without di¤erentiated nancial assets and explicit
stock-ow relations.
3 General framework
3.1 Firms, banks and households
This section presents our general framework. The framework leaves out open
economy issues, there is no analysis of the short run and stability issues, and
5 In fact the coe¢ cient on rentiers share is not negative in all specications and it is
insignicant in many. Moreover, there may be several explanations for a negative coe¢ cient.
Net nancial income, rst, is included in the gross prot share and for any given prot share,
an increase in nancial income implies a reduction in operating prots which presumably
reduces the incentive to accumulate xed capital. As noted by Stockhammer, second, an
increase in gross nancial income may mirror an increase in the cost of capital. Firms have
both nancial assets and liabilities and if the return on these move together, a rise in the
cost of capital will be associated with an increase in gross nancial income. This correlation
becomes particularly important if the cost-of-capital variable that is included in the analysis
provides a poor approximation to the actual cost of capital.
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very limited attention to government policy. The purpose is to look at the inter-
action between rms and households across labor, goods and nancial markets.
Firms, it is assumed, make decisions concerning pricing / output, accumulation,
and nancing; households receive a return on their nancial assets as well as
wage income, and they make consumption and portfolio decisions; banks accept
deposits and make loans. There are only two types of nancial assets, equity
and bank deposits, and banks are the only nancial institution in the model.6
This framework - which generalizes the one in Skott (1988, 1989) - covers
a number of special cases, including Harrodian specications with or without
labor constraints and Kaleckian models.
3.1.1 Firms
Finance constraint Consider rst the nance constraint facing a single rm.
The rm invests in real capital and pays out dividends and interest on its debt
(bank loans). These expenses have to be matched by income ows and the pro-
ceeds from new issues of equity and new debt. As argued by the nancialization
literature, the rm may hold equity in other rms and own other nancial assets
(bank deposits). Income ows therefore include both prots and the interest
and dividend income from the rms current holdings of nancial assets. Alge-
braically, the nance constraint can be written
pIj +Div
L
j + iM
L
j + v
_NAj +
_MAj = j + v
_NLj + _M
L
j + iM
A
j +Div
A
j
where I;; Div;M and N denote real investment, nominal prots, dividends,
bank loans / deposits and the number of shares. Subscripts j indicate rm,
and superscripts denote assets (A) and liabilities (L); thus MAj is rm js bank
deposits andMLj the rms bank loans. Bank loans and deposits carry the same
interest rate (i), the price of investment goods (p) equals the general price of
output in this one-sector model and, for simplicity, it is assumed that all shares
have the same price, v.
If we aggregate across rms, the cross holdings of nancial assets net out,
and the aggregate nance constraint for the rm sector simplies to:
pI +Div + iM = + v _N + _M
where I;; Div;M and N without sub- and superscripts - denote aggregate
investment and aggregate prot, net dividend payments from rms to other
sectors, net debt to other sectors, and the aggregate number of shares held by
other sectors.
We assume that dividends are related to retained earnings
Div = (1  sf )(  rM) (1)
6The liquid asset could also be interpreted as a short bond.
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where r is the real rate of interest, r = i  p^. Thus, the nance constraint can
also be rewritten
pI = sf (  rM) + vNN^ +M(M^   p^) (2)
The nance constraint (2) shows that, given the levels of investment and
prots and the inherited debt, rms cannot choose the retention rate, the rate
of new issues and the amount of new debt independently. One of these three
variables will have to accommodate so as to ensure that the nance constraint
is being met. In reality, of course, there may be dynamic feedback e¤ects: an
unexpected need for external nance in one period, for instance, may inuence
rms retention and/or new issue policies in subsequent periods.
Our purpose in this paper is to examine the comparative statics of changes
in nancial behavior and from this perspective it does not matter much which
nancial variable is designated as residual. In the analysis below we describe
rmsnancial behavior in terms of their retention rate (sf ). New issue policies
can be captured by the growth of the number of shares (N^) or by the share
of investment that is being nanced by new issues. Skott uses the former and
Lavoie-Godley the latter parameterization, and we follow these di¤erent para-
meterizations in the respective versions of the model.7
Pricing / output: the growth function It is often assumed that rms
set prices and that output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to match de-
mand. The empirical evidence in favour of signicant price rigidity is quite
weak, however.8 The real question, moreover, is not whether there is stickiness
in prices but whether prices are more sticky than output. Production is subject
to a production lag, and increases in production and employment give rise to
substantial search, hiring and training costs; ring or layo¤s also involve costs,
both explicit costs like redundancy payments and hidden costs in the form of
deteriorating industrial relations and morale. In a continuous-time setting one
may approximate the e¤ects of lags and adjustment costs by assuming that out-
put is predetermined at each moment, that rms choose the rate of growth of
output at each moment, rather than the level of output, and that this choice
is made so as to balance the costs of changes against the benets of moving
toward a preferred level of output and employment. These costs and benets
7One could also, following Eichner (1976) and Wood (1975) - assume that rms set the
shares of investment that are to be nanced by the three di¤erent sources, with both sf and
N^ varying in response to changes in accumulation. This case is considered in Skott (1989,
chapter 7).
8The study by Levy et al. (1997) of menu costs in ve supermarkets, for instance, is often
cited in support of menu costs and price stickiness (e.g. Romer 2001, pp. 315-316). This study
found that on average 16 percent of all prices were changed each week. These frequent changes
in prices were not costless but the nding that menu costs constitute a signicant proportion
of net prots is largely irrelevant for an evaluation of price exibility. With prohibitively
high menu costs, for instance, there would be no price changes and the share of menu cost
in revenue would be zero; negligible menu costs on the other hand may allow rms to change
prices frequently as part of their marketing strategies, and the observed share of menu costs
in net prots could be very high in this case.
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are determined by demand signals from output markets and cost signals from
input markets.
If prices are exible, the demand signal can be captured by the prevailing
prot share. The level of output is predetermined at any moment, and a rise
in demand leads to an increase in the price of output. Wage contracts are cast
in terms of money wages, and there is neither perfect foresight nor instanta-
neous feedbacks from output prices to money-wage rates. The real wage rate
and the share of prots in income therefore respond to unanticipated move-
ments in prices: a positive demand shock generates a rise in the prot share.
Demand signals could also be reected in inventories. For the aggregate econ-
omy, however, movements in inventories tend to amplify uctuations in other
demand components over the cycle and thus do not obviate the need for price
adjustments. For simplicity, we disregard movements in inventories.
Turning to the signals from input markets, we leave out intermediate inputs
and take labour to be the only input that is variable in the short run; changes
in the capital stock take longer to implement and, partly because of that, rms
typically maintain excess capital capacity. As far as production decisions are
concerned, the labour market therefore provides the relevant signal, and we use
the employment rate as the indicator of the state of the labour market. The rate
of employment inuences the costs of changing output through its e¤ects on the
availability of labour with the desired qualications. High rates of employment
increase the costs of recruitment, and since the quit rate tends to rise when
labour markets are tight, the gross recruitment needs associated with any given
rate of expansion increase at a time when low unemployment makes it di¢ cult to
attract new workers. High employment and high turnover of the labour force, on
the other hand, may allow rms to contract production and employment more
rapidly without signicant redundancy costs. These standard microeconomic
e¤ects may be reinforced by broader Marxian e¤ects on the social relations of
production. A high rate of employment may have a negative impact on rms
growth plans because it strengthens workers vis-a-vis management and may lead
to increased shop-oor militancy.
The analysis suggests that the rate of growth of production will be positively
related to the prot share () and negatively related to the employment rate (e).
Thus, the pricing / output decisions can be described by the following growth
function9
Y^ = h(; e);h > 0; he < 0: (3)
The case of unlimited labor supplies can be obtained by setting he = 0; and the
growth function yields the standard Kaleckian assumption of a xed prot share
 (a xed markup on wage cost) if we have both he = 0 and h =1 at  = .
One may note also that a static counterpart to equation (3) can be obtained
by setting Y^ = 0. The equation then denes the prot share as an increasing
function of the employment rate. A short-run equilibrium relation of this kind
9Or output expansion function, using the terminology in Skott (1989, 1989a). The be-
havioral foundations of the function are discussed in greater detail in Skott (1989, chapter
4).
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could be derived from prot maximization if rms have monopsony power and
the perceived elasticity of labor supply to the individual rm is inversely related
to the aggregate rate of employment.10
Accumulation As a general specication we may assume that the rate of
accumulation depends on the rate of utilization of capital, the prot share, and
nancial variables like the real rate of interest, the valuation ratio (Tobins q),
and the ratios of debt and retained earnings to the value of the capital stock.
Algebraically,
I
K
= f(u; ; r; q;m; c) (4)
where u is utilization, q the valuation ratio (q = M+vNpK ), and m and c the ratios
of debt and retained earnings to capital (m = MpK ; c =
sf ( rM)
pK ).
There is no consensus in the structuralist / post Keynesian literature con-
cerning the long-run sensitivity of the accumulation rate to changes in the
various arguments.11 In the analysis below, we explore both Harrodian and
Kaleckian specications.
3.1.2 Banks
Banks give loans to rms and accept deposits from households. Neither rms
nor households hold cash. When banks provide a loan to a rm, the money
therefore returns to the bank immediately, either as deposits from households
or because other rms use their increased revenues to reduce their debt. The
loan and deposit rates are equal and there are no costs involved in banking.
Thus, banks make neither prots nor losses,12 and the rm sector has a net
debt (M) that must equal the total deposits of the household sector (=money
demand, MH):
M =MH
Banks determine the nominal interest rate. This nominal rate, however, will
typically depend on ination and to simplify the exposition, we treat the real
rate of interest r (= i  p^) as the variable that is set by the banking system (and
kept constant in steady growth).
10A positive relation between employment and the prot share could also arise from an
inverse relation between the perceived demand elasticity and aggregate employment or as a
result of a xed markup on variable cost in a setting with overhead labor.
11See, among others, Auerbach and Skott (1988), Dutt (1997), Kurz (1986), Lavoie (1995)
and Flaschel and Skott (2006).
12The share valuation of banks therefore is zero, and this simple version of the model does
not capture the increasing share of the nancial sector in GDP and of nancial-sector prots
in total prots.
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3.1.3 Households
In analogy with rms, households face a budget (or nance) constraint. For the
household sector as a whole it takes the form
pC + v _NH + _MH =W +DivH + iMH (5)
where C is consumption, W wage income, NH ;MH indicate household holdings
of shares and deposits (money), and DivH is dividend payments received by the
household sector.
The steady-growth implications of household consumption and saving behav-
ior can be described in terms of stock-ow ratios of assets to income. Specically,
let
MH = (i; r; re; ; :::)pY (6)
vNH = (i; r; re; ; :::)pY (7)
where the stock-ow ratios  and  may depend on a number of variables,
including the real rates of return on deposits (r) and equity (re). Theories
di¤er with respect to the determination of the (steady-growth) values of these
stock-ow ratios, and in sections 4-5 we examine di¤erent specications. Some
theories are cast in terms of ow-ow relations (e.g. consumption as a function of
distributed incomes and capital gains, as in the Lavoie-Godley model) but even
when this is the case, the specication of the ow-ow relations have implications
for the steady-growth values of the stock-ow ratios, and the implied stock-ow
ratios provide a clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the e¤ects of changes
in nancial behavior.
The relation between the stock-ow ratios and consumption is straightfor-
ward. Using the budget constraint (5) and the dividend equation (1), the stock-
ow relations (6)-(7) imply the following consumption function:
C
K
= u[1  sf (   r) + (p^  M^)  N^ ] (8)
4 Harrodian accumulation
In this section we follow the Harrodian tradition and assume that the degree
of excess capital capacity is at (or near) where rms want it to be. Firms will
typically want a reserve of excess capacity, but if the degree of excess capacity
persistently exceeds the desired reserve, they reduce their accumulation rate;
conversely, if they nd themselves with less than the desired excess capacity,
they will gradually increase their rate of accumulation. Thus, a steady growth
path with a constant accumulation rate requires the consistency of desired and
actual degrees of excess capacity, that is,
u = u (9)
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where u is the output-capital ratio and u denotes the value of u when rms
have the desired degree of excess capacity.13 Equation (9) expresses the steady-
growth accumulation function. The equation need not be satised outside steady
growth, but a simple Harrodian specication implies that if K^ uctuates within
a relatively narrow band, the time-average of the output-capital ratio u must
be approximately equal to u when the average is taken over a long period. To
see this, consider the Harrodian investment function
d
dt
K^ = (u  u); > 0
Integration implies that u u = K^t1 K^t0(t1 t0) where u is the average output-capital
ratio over the interval [t0; t1]. If j K^t1   K^t0 j is bounded below some constant,
it follows that u is close to u if the period is long (u converges to u for t1  t0
going to innity).
4.1 A mature economy: labor-constrained steady growth
The growth rate in a mature economy is labor constrained and the employment
rate is constant in steady growth. The growth rate therefore must be equal to
the growth of the labor force and, for simplicity, we shall take this natural rate
of growth(n) to be an exogenously given constant. Thus, in steady growth
Y^ = n (10)
Using (9) and (10) the equilibrium condition for the product market can now
be written
C
K
+ n = u
or, using (6), (8), (9) and (10),
[1  sf (   r)  n  N^ ] = u
   n
u
(11)
The e¤ects of changes in rmsnancial behavior (sf ; N^), bank policy (r), or
household saving and portfolio behavior can be derived from this equation. The
qualitative results, however, depend on the properties of the  and  functions
that describe household behavior.
4.1.1 Inelastic stock-ow ratios
Assume rst that  and  are both constant (independent of the various rates
of return). The constancy of the term on the left hand side of equation (11)
13The u = u condition is necessary but not su¢ cient. Firms must also make positive
prots, cf. note 14 below.
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implies that
@
@sf
=     r
sf
< 0 (12)
@
@N^
=   
sf
< 0 (13)
@
@r
=  > 0 (14)
@
@
=   N^
sf
@
@
=
sfr   n
sf
The signs of the e¤ects of changes in sf ; N^ and r are unambiguous. If rms raise
the retention rate or increase the rate of new issues, this will depress protability,
while an increase in the real interest rate raises the prot share.14 The intuition
is simple. An increase in sf increases aggregate saving, given the share of
prots, and to bring saving back into line with the steady-growth requirement,
a reduction in the prot share is needed. An increase in the real interest rate
(r) has the opposite e¤ect since it reduces retained earnings and thus saving at
any given share of prots. An increase in new issues (N^); like increases in the
retention rate, raises aggregate saving but the mechanism may be a little less
transparent. Saving goes up because the rise in N^ induces households to raise
their saving. Share prices adjust so as to maintain a constant ratio (= ) of
the value of shares to income. The growth of real income is given, and if the
rate of new issues has gone up, this means that real share prices will increase
at a lower rate. Capital gains therefore are smaller and as a result households
choose to save a larger proportion of their wage, dividend and interest income.
Financialization has been associated primarily with increased dividends (a
decline in sf ), a decrease in the rate of new issues (N^) and an increase in the
real rate of interest (although, as shown in section 2, the evidence for interest
rates is questionable). Strikingly, in this model all of these changes unambigu-
ously generate a rise in the steady-growth prot share and the steady-growth
employment rate. The employment e¤ect follows immediately from the growth
function (3): whenever the prot share goes up, the employment rate must do
the same in order to keep the growth rate unchanged.15
So far we have taken  and  to be constant. Even leaving aside the func-
tional dependence of these ratios on, inter alia, the rates of return, nancializa-
tion might generate a shift in the levels of  and : Thus, it could be argued
that nancialization increases the availability of consumer credit and thereby
14A capitalist economy would not be viable if the steady growth path implied that prots
fall short of real interest payments on the debt. Thus, the condition    r > 0 must hold,
otherwise accumulation would collapse.
15 In this paper we do not consider nominal wage formation and ination explicitly. The
NAIRU literature is enormous; one of us has analysed reasons for the absence of a NAIRU in
earlier work (Skott 1997, 1999, 2005).
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tends to reduce the ratio : A reduction in  has two e¤ects: it increases re-
tained earnings (which tends to increase consumption) but if the growth rate
of income is positive it also reduces the amount of saving that households need
to carry out in order to maintain the money-income ratio at the desired value.
Depending on parameter values, the balance of these two e¤ects can be positive
or negative.16
Changes in the  ratio are not usually seen as a key mechanism behind
changes in economic performance.17 Moreover, in this model the e¤ects of
autonomous shifts in  depend on the values of N^ . This result is quite intuitive.
The value of the equity-income ratio () simply does not a¤ect saving if there
are no new issues. Households can only save in the form of shares if other sectors
(rms) are willing to sell shares. If that is not the case then an increase in the
desire to own shares will simply generate higher share prices, and the desire will
be met without any extra saving. With positive new issues, a higher valuation
of shares (a higher ) implies an increase in household saving; with negative new
issues, on the other hand, a higher valuation of shares implies that households
receive higher revenues from their net sale of shares, and their saving out of
wages, dividends and interest income is reduced.
In addition to the changes in nancial behavior, nancialization may have
been associated with a downward shift in the investment function. In this
Harrodian setting, such a shift would be reected in a rise in the desired output-
capital ratio u. This kind of change has the consequences that one would
expect. Equation (11) implies that a rise in u leads to a decline in the prot
share and, using the growth function (3), a fall a employment. Thus, according
to this model the changes associated with neoliberalism and nancialization have
contradictory e¤ects. The net e¤ect may have been a deterioration of economic
performance, but the negative impact comes from the shift in the investment
function, rather than from the changes in nancial behavior that have been
highlighted in the literature.
16Our results for changes in  are closely related to those of Dutts (2005) analysis of
changes in consumer debt. Using a Kaleckian (stagnationist) model, Dutt shows that the
short-run e¤ect of an increase in householdsdebt-income ratio (corresponding to a decrease
in  in this model) is unambiguously positive. This short-run result is not surprising since
the the transition to a higher debt ratio is associated with extra consumption. The long-run
e¤ects on growth are ambiguous, however. In the long run, the debt ratio has increased (
has decreased), and this increase in the debt ratio implies a shift of disposable income from
low-saving workers to high-saving capitalists. This contractionary e¤ect may or may not be
o¤set by a positive e¤ect. Consumer debt grows at the same rate as output (and the capital
stock) and this expansionary e¤ect - consumers being allowed to increase their debt when
output grows - depends on the growth rate. Thus, in Dutts model, an increase in consumer
debt will raise the growth rate if the initial growth rate is high while if output grows slowly,
the increase in debt will reduce the growth rate. In this version of our model, the growth rate
is exogenous but the analogous result in our model is that a decrease in  raises the prot
share if the growth rate is high but reduces the prot share if the growth rate is small is low.
17One might consider the possibility that u depend on the valuation ratio (Tobins q) and
thereby on  and . A high valuation ratio indicates a rate of prot that exceeds the cost of
nance. The desired output-capital ratio may therefore be inversely related to the valuation
rate. This expansionary impact of an increase and  and  is considered by Skott (1988,
1989).
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How general are these conclusions? The assumption of exogenous   and
  ratios is clearly restrictive, but the qualitative results survive as long as 
and  are relatively insensitive to changes in the nancial parameters (sf ; N^ ; r)
and the prot share ().
Di¤erentiating equation (11) totally, we get
 sfd   dsf + (sfr   n)d + (sfdr + rdsf )  dN^   N^d = 0 (15)
where
d =
@
@sf
dsf +
@
@N^
dN^ +
@
@r
dr +
@
@
d (16)
d =
@
@sf
dsf +
@
@N^
dN^ +
@
@r
dr +
@
@
d (17)
sf ; N^ ; r and  may not inuence  and  directly but they will do so indirectly
via their e¤ects on the various rates of return. Thus, the partial @@sf includes
the indirect e¤ect on  of changes in rates of return generated by the change in
sf . The rate of return on equity, for instance, is given by re =
(1 sf )( r)pY
vN +
v^   p^ = (1 sf )( r) + n  N^ and an increase in sf reduces re18
Using (15)-(17) we get
@
@sf
=  
   r   (sfr   n) @@sf + N^ @@sf
sf   (sfr   n)@@ + N^ @@
(18)
@
@N^
=    (sfr   n)
@
@N^
+ N^ @
@N^
sf   (sfr   n)@@ + N^ @@
(19)
@
@r
=
sf + (sfr   n)@@r   N^ @@r
sf   (sfr   n)@@ + N^ @@
(20)
The signs of the partials of the prot share with respect to these three
nancial parameters are the same as in (12)-(14) as long as
   r > (sfr   n) @
@sf
  N^ @
@sf
 > (sfr   n) @
@N^
  N^ @
@N^
sf >  (sfr   n)@
@r
+ N^
@
@r
sf > (sfr   n)@
@
  N^ @
@
These inelasticity conditions will automatically be satised if (sfr   n) =
N^ = 0, irrespective how sensitive are  and  to variations in their arguments.
18Mathematically, perverse results are possible in which a rise in sf increases the return.
This could happen, for instance, if there is a strong inverse relation between  and re. The
conditions that would give these perverse results can be ruled out on economic grounds.
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Empirically, both sfr n and N^ are close to zero, having at times been positive
and at times negative. In fact, setting (sfr n) = N^ = 0 is arguably a reasonable
empirical benchmark. Thus, the qualitative results in (12)-(14) survive - at least
as an outcome that holds for a range of empirically very plausible parameter
values - in a more general model in which the stock-ow ratios are determined
endogenously. It should be noted also that the di¤erent specications used in
Skott (1981, 1988, 1989) are special cases of the general model with endogenous
 and  ratios;19 all of these special cases satisfy the inelasticity conditions for
any reasonable set of parameters, as does the ow-ow specication used by
Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) (see below).
Overall, then, while the implications of assuming elastic stock-ow ratios are
clear - the comparative statics will be reversed - inelastic ratios appear to be
the more interesting and empirically relevant case.20
4.1.2 The Lavoie-Godley specication of consumption
In the Lavoie-Godley model, consumption is a function of distributed income
and capital gains. Thus, the consumption function is specied as a ow-ow
relation. Using our notation, a general version of their consumption function
can be written as:
C
K
=  (y; );  y > 0;   > 0 (21)
where y is householdsdistributed income and  is capital gains, both variables
as ratios of the capital stock (y = [1   sf (   r) + p^]u and  = vN(v^ p^)pK ).
The proportion of the investment expenditure that is nanced by equity issues
is denoted as x. Lavoie and Godley take this proportion as the parameter
describing new issue policies (instead of N^ ). By denition
vN
pK
N^ = x
I
K
= xg
where g is the accumulation rate. Thus, the ratio of capital gains to capital can
be written
 = ug   xg
The equilibrium condition (11) is general and still holds in the Lavoie-Godley
specication and - using the denition of x - the equation can be written
u   n = u
h
1  sf (   r)  n  xn
u
i
=  (y; ) (22)
19Skott (1989), for instance, assumes that  is exogenous and that vN = (; u; r; )pY =
(   
u
  r)pY where  is the rate of depreciation; thus, share valuation is proportional to
prots net of depreciation and real interest payments.
20We use the terms inelasticand elasticto denote the cases when the conditions hold and
fail to hold, respectively. Intermediate cases in which some but not all of the conditions hold
are clearly possible; in these cases only some of the signs of the partials in (12)-(14) will be
preserved.
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The steady growth value of  (and ) is a¤ected by the consumption / saving
function (21) and household portfolio decisions. In the Lavoie-Godley model
these portfolio decisions are described by
M
M + vN
 
+ 
= z(r; re; y); zr > 0; zre < 0; zy > 0 (23)
where re is the rate of return on equities (re = (1 sf )( r)u+n(u x)u ).
For some functional forms of  in (22) and z in (23), it may be possible
to obtain analytical expressions for  and ; as in our general representation
for the stock-ow ratios, (6) and (7); other specications - including the ones
used by Lavoie and Godley - may preclude explicit analytical expressions but
the stock-ow implications can still be evaluated numerically.
With the relevant denitions, (22) and (23) determine the equilibrium values
of ,  and . Each exogenous variable (sf , x, r, among others) a¤ects the
equilibrium stock-ow ratios  and  as well as the prot share ; and we get
expressions that are analogous to (18)-(20):
@
@sf
=  
   r   (sfr   n) @@sf
sf   (sfr   n)@@
@
@x
=   n  (sfr   n)u
 @
@x
sfu   (sfr   n)u @@
@
@r
=
sf + (sfr   n)@@r
sf   (sfr   n)@@
The total e¤ect on the prot share of each parameter can be decomposed into
the e¤ect for a given  and , and the derived e¤ect via changes in  and .
The rst e¤ect is clear and straightforward as shown in section 4.1.1. Our main
concern here is whether the inelasticity conditionsfor stock-ow ratios hold in
the Lavoie-Godley specication.
Using Lavoie and Godleys values for the parameters,21 we nd that in the
Harrodian mature economy, the indirect e¤ects via changes in  and  are
quite small, with the direct e¤ects corresponding to constant stock-ow ratios
explaining most of the total e¤ects. Table 1 shows the numerical results. The
numbers in Table 1 indicate the derivatives of the prot share with respect to
each exogenous parameter, evaluated at the equilibrium associated with Lavoie
and Godleys original values of parameters.22
21Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) did not report parameter values but have provided the
values in private correspondence. These parameter values and our procedure of decomposition
are given in the Appendix.
22 In this paper we simply use Lavoie and Godleys parameter values, leaving for future
research a more careful examination of whether our inelasticity conditionsare robust with
respect to reasonable variations in these parameter values.
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4.2 Dual economies: endogenous growth
We now turn to the case of dual economies, that is, economies in which the
labor force does not constrain the rate of growth. This case may correspond
to economies with large amounts of hidden unemployment in backward, non-
capitalist sectors, or it could depict the case where the labor supply to the
capitalist sector is perfectly elastic for other reasons (immigration, womens
participation rate, endogenous fertility, or technical progress).
The growth function needs to be modied in a dual economy of this kind.
The employment rate no longer serves as a relevant signal and therefore drops
out of the growth function. Hence,
Y^ = h();h0 > 0
In steady growth we still have g = Y^ = K^ and u = u, and the equilibrium
condition for the product market takes the form
[1  sf (   r)  h()  N^ ] = 1  1
u
h() (24)
4.2.1 Inelastic stock-ow ratios
In the case with exogenous  and  ratios, equation (24) gives the following
comparative statics:
@
@sf
=      r
sf + (   1u )h0()
< 0
@
@N^
=   
sf + (   1u )h0()
< 0
@
@r
=
sf
sf + (   1u )h0()
@
@
=   N^
sf + (   1u )h0()
@
@
=
sfr   n
sf + (   1u )h0()
The signs of these partials depend on the magnitude of h0(): The expression
   1u = M pKpY is negative for any empirically reasonable specication, and it
follows that compared to the labor constrained case, the comparative statics are
unchanged if h0 is smallbut reversed if h0 is large. The standard Kaleckian
formulation with  =  corresponds to the limiting case with h0 !1. This may
be an extreme case, but in the absence of labor constraints one would expect
a high sensitivity of growth to variations in protability. Thus, the large-h0
case with the reversal of comparative statics for the prot share seems the most
reasonable.
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Changes in the prot share inuence the growth rate in a dual economy,
rather than the employment rate as in the labor-constrained economy. Expres-
sions for the growth rate e¤ects are readily obtained in the limiting case with
a constant markup formulation (h0() ! 1 at  = ). In this limiting case
equation (24) can be rewritten
[1  sf (   r)  g   N^ ] = 1  1
u
g
and
@g
@sf
=
(   r)u
1  u > 0
@g
@N^
=
u
1  u > 0
@g
@r
=   sfu

1  u < 0
@g
@
=
N^u
1  u
@g
@
=
(g   sfr)u
1  u
The signs of the e¤ects of changes in sf ; N^ and r are clear. If rms raise
the retention rate or increase the rate of new issues, this will increase the rate
of capital accumulation, while an increase in the real interest rate slows down
accumulation. The intuition is simple. Since u and  are una¤ected by changes
in sf ; N^ and r, the e¤ects on accumulation of changes in sf ; N^ and r derive
exclusively from their direct impacts on saving and the amount of available
nance. Given that u = u and  = , an increase in sf or N^ must increase
the amount of nancial resources available to rms - raising the rate of capital
accumulation - while a rise in r has the opposite e¤ect on accumulation since it
reduces the amount of retained earnings.23
4.2.2 The Lavoie-Godley specication of consumption
As we have seen in section 4.1.2, householdsconsumption/saving and portfolio
decisions in Lavoie-Godley (2001-2002) implicitly dene the stock-ow ratios, 
and , as functions of a number of variables, and the accumulation rate becomes
an additional inuence on  and  in the dual economy. Analogously to the
analysis in section 4.1.2, we obtain the following comparative statics.
23 It is easy to understand these comparative statics by looking at the closed-form solution
for the rate of capital accumulation, i.e. g =
[sf ( r)+N^ ]u
1 u .
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@g
@sf
=
   r   (sfr   g) @@sf
1
u (1  u   x) + (sfr   g)@@g
@g
@x
=
1
u g   (sfr   g)@@x
1
u (1  u   x) + (sfr   g)@@g
@g
@r
=   sf + (sfr   g)
@
@r
1
u (1  u   x) + (sfr   g)@@g
We follow a decomposition procedure that is similar to the one in 4.1.1
in order to check if the inelasticity conditions for the stock-ow ratios hold
in Harrodian dual economies. Table 2 reports the numerical results based on
Lavoie and Godleys parameter values.
The signs of the derivatives of g with respect to the parameters are the same
in the variable  and  regime as in the constant  and  regime, that is, our
inelasticity conditionshold in Harrodian dual economies with a Lavoie-Godley
specication of consumption and portfolio behavior. However, the absolute
values of the derivatives in the case of constant  and  are much greater than
those in the case of variable  and . Thus, the adjustment of  and  caused
by changes in the parameters produce signicant and partially o¤setting e¤ects
on accumulation.
5 A Kaleckian model
Our Kaleckian model di¤ers from Harrodian models with respect to the speci-
cation of accumulation. Unlike in the Harrodian framework, the utilization rate
u becomes an accommodating variable, and a shift in aggregate demand may
generate a permanent change in utilization. The prot share, by contrast, is
treated as exogenous,  = ; and the labor supply is taken be perfectly elastic
(that is, the model describes the dual-economy case). The Kaleckian model,
nally, often imposes stagnationistassumptions which ensure that an increase
in the prot share will reduce utilization; most of our results for the compara-
tive statics of changes in nancial behavior do not depend on these additional
assumptions.
5.1 Inelastic stock-ow ratios
By using the denition of  and , Tobins q, the debt-capital ratio, and the
ratio of retained earnings to capital can be written as:
q = (+ )u
m = u
c = sf (   r)u
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Thus, for given values of ;  and , the accumulation function (4) becomes a
function of utilization only:
I
K
= f(u; ; r; q;m; c) = f(u; ; r; (+)u; u; sf ( r)u)  (u;; ; r; ; sf )
From (8) and the product market equilibrium condition, we now have
(u;; ; r; ; sf ) = [sf (   r) + (u) + N^ ]u (25)
We may interpret the terms in the bracket on the right hand side of (25) as
the average saving rate. Following the Kaleckian tradition, we assume that the
traditional Keynesian short-run stability assumption holds in the long run, too,
that is, we assume that saving is more responsive than investment to changes
in the utilization rate. If the   and  ratios are exogenous, we then have
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0 > 0 (26)
and - assuming positive autonomous investment, (0;; ; r; ; sf ) > 0 - it can
be shown that there is a unique positive solution for u in the interval (0; 1 ).
For empirically reasonable magnitudes of the negative e¤ect on capital ac-
cumulation of debt-capital ratio, accumulation is increasing in the utilization
rate, i.e. 0(u) > 0;24 and we have the following comparative statics for the
utilization rate:
@u
@
=
(1  u)f + usff(1  u)fc   1g
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
(27)
@u
@sf
=
(   r)uf(1  u)fc   1g
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
< 0 (28)
@u
@N^
=   u
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
< 0
@u
@r
=
(1  u)(fr   fcsfu) + sfu
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
du
d
=
fq(1  u)u  N^u
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
du
d
=
(sfr   g)u+ (1  u)(fq + fm   fcsfr)u
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
The stagnationist case is obtained if an increase in the prot share generates
a decline in utilization. Comparing (27) and (28) it is readily seen that in this
stagnationist case an increase in the retention rate must depress the rate of
utilization: it follows from (26) and (27) that (1   u)fc < 1 is a necessary
condition for @u@ < 0. However, the determinate sign of the partial derivative
of the utilization rate with respect to the retention ratio can also be justied
24The mathematical condition for 0(u) > 0 is jfmj < fu + fq(+ ) + fcsf (   r).
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directly by the empirically mild assumption that (1   u)fc < 1.25 Given
this assumption, an increase in sf lowers the utilization rate since, for a given
u, saving rises more sharply than investment, and the utilization rate must
decrease in order to restore the product market equilibrium. Analogously - and
independently of whether @u@ < 0 - the average saving rate rises as N^ increases
since more household income goes to purchasing equities rather than buying
consumer goods. This depresses the level of e¤ective demand and results in a
lower rate of utilization.
The increase in the real interest rate has a negative impact on both saving
and investment. It lowers the amount of corporate saving, and the decrease in
retained earnings depresses accumulation for a given rate of utilization. Saving
falls more sharply than investment if the direct negative impact on investment
of changes in r is not too large, i.e. (1  u)(fr   fcsfu) + sfu > 0. Under
this assumption, to restore the product market equilibrium, a higher utilization
rate is required. However, if (1  u)(fr   fcsfu) + sfu < 0, the higher real
interest rate requires a lower utilization rate for the product market equilibrium.
The e¤ects of changes in a and ; again, are ambiguous.
The e¤ects on accumulation of changes in the nancial variables are given
by:
@g
@
= f + sfufc + 
0 @u
@
(29)
@g
@sf
= fc(   r)u+ 0 @u
@sf
(30)
@g
@N^
= 0
@u
@N^
< 0 (31)
@g
@r
= fr   fcsfu+ 0 @u
@r
(32)
The result for @g@ in equation (29) is parallel to Marglin and Bhaduris (1990)
analysis of wage and prot led growth in a stagnationist regime. The direct and
positive e¤ect on accumulation of an increase in the prot share may or may not
be dominated by the e¤ect of a decline in utilization. A rise in the retention
rate - equation (30) - also produces conicting e¤ects on accumulation. The
rst term in (30), fc( r)u, captures a direct positive impact on accumulation
from an increase in the amount of internal funds, but an increase in the retention
rate also has a negative e¤ect on accumulation by lowering the utilization rate
(the second term in (30), 0 @u@sf , is negative). Which e¤ect dominates is an
empirical matter but - using the expressions for @u@ and
@u
@sf
- it follows that in
25 It is di¢ cult to see how an increase in retained earnings - keeping constant u; ; r; q;m -
can lead to a more than one-for-one increase in investment, that is, one would expect fc  1.
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this model @g@sf > 0 is a su¢ cient condition for growth to be prot led.
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The e¤ect on capital accumulation of an increase in the rate of equity issues
is more clear-cut. An increase in N^ leads to a lower rate of utilization, and the
lower utilization rate depresses capital accumulation.
Real interest rates have ambiguous e¤ects. The direct e¤ect on accumula-
tion of a rise in the real rate of interest is negative but the derived e¤ect on
accumulation via changes in the utilization may be positive: fr fcsfu in (32)
is negative, but the sign of 0 @u@r in (32) can be positive or negative, leaving
unclear the sign of the total e¤ect. The ambiguity that characterizes the e¤ects
of changes in  and  on utilization also carry over to the e¤ects on the growth
rate.
Financialization, nally, may have been associated with a downward shift
in the accumulation function, f (or ). A downward shift of this kind leads
to a lower utilization rate, and this fall in utilization exacerbates the decline in
accumulation.
Strikingly, the comparative static results for a stagnationist dual economy
resemble those for the mature Harrodian economy. A fall in the rate of new
equity issues is expansionary in both models. In the stagnationist model it
leads to a higher utilization rate and a higher accumulation rate; in the Harro-
dian model prots and employment both increase. A decrease in the retention
rate, moreover, may (but need not) increase both the utilization rate and the
capital accumulation rate in the stagnationist model and it raises prots and
employment in the Harrodian case.
5.2 The Lavoie-Godley specication of consumption and
accumulation
In Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002), the accumulation function is given by
g = 0 + 1sf ( u  rm)  2rm+ 3q + 4u
where 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 are positive constants. Using the denitions of q,
m,  and , this accumulation function can be rewritten:
26We have
@g
@
= f + sfufc + 
0 @u
@
= f + sfufc + 
0 (1  u)f + usff(1  u)fc   1g
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
= f + 
0 (1  u)f
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
+
sf
   r [(   r)ufc + 
0 (   r)uf(1  u)fc   1g
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
]
= f + 
0 (1  u)f
sf (   r) + (0u+ g) + N^   0
+
sf
   r
@g
@sf
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g = 0 + [1sf (    r)  2r + 3(+ ) + 4]u (33)
If the  and  ratios are constant, we have a special linear version of our function
(u) in the previous section, and the sensitivity of investment to the utilization
rate depends on the various parameters, including  and . The Lavoie-Godley
specication of consumption and portfolio behavior, however, implies that the
 and  ratios are endogenous and that the response of investment to changes
in u will be a¤ected by the endogenous adjustment of the stock-ow ratios 
and .
The consumption function and householdsportfolio choice have been de-
scribed already in section 4.1.2. For convenience we reproduce the key equations
(22)-(23) here:
u  g = u
h
1  sf (   r)  g   xg
u
i
=  (y; ) (34)

+ 
= z(r; re; y) (35)
where  = ug xg, y = [1 sf ( r)+ p^]u, and re = (1 sf )( r)u+g(u x)u .
Unlike in section 4.1.2, g and u are endogenously determined while  is a para-
meter.
The system (33)-(35) determines four endogenous variables, g, u,  and 
((34) contains two equations). This system is equivalent to the steady-growth
system in Lavoie and Godley (2000-2001).27 It can be compared to one in which
accumulation is described by (33), but in which  and  are assumed constant
(that is, in which we drop (35) and the last equation in (34)).
Analytical solutions are hard to obtain, but using the original parameter val-
ues in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) our inelasticity conditions for stock-ow
ratios survive in this stagnationist Lavoie-Godley system. Table 3 describes the
numerical results. Qualitatively, the macroeconomic e¤ects of nancialization
on the steady state are the same in the xed ;  system and the Lavoie-Godley
model. In both models, the e¤ects of an increase in the retention rate are neg-
ative for both utilization and accumulation. Thus, given the parameter cong-
uration, the direct positive impact of a rise in sf on accumulation is dominated
by its negative utilization e¤ect on accumulation. A rise in the share of invest-
ment nanced by new issues has a contractionary e¤ect on both utilization and
accumulation. An increase in the real interest rate on the utilization rate has an
positive e¤ect on the utilization rate, but this positive utilization e¤ect is o¤set
by the negative e¤ect of the higher interest rate on accumulation: accumulation
slows down in the face of the higher real rate of interest.
The similarity between the systems with constant and endogenous  and 
ratios is not just qualitative. The derivatives of u and g with respect to the
27The only small di¤erence between Lavoie and Godley steady-state system and ours lies
in the lag structure of variables. In our analysis, we make all level variables in each equation
contemporaneous.
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various parameters are also similar in magnitudes. Thus, the e¤ects on u and g
of induced adjustments of  and  are quantitatively small.28 This result is not
surprising since, as indicated by Table 4, the values of the  and  ratios appear
to be rather insensitive to variations in the nancial parameters (the parameter
changes in the table are very substantial).
6 Conclusion
Financialization is a short-hand expression for a number of developments over
the last 30 years. The term is convenient but these developments may not have
the coherence and unity suggested by the term and they may not signal the
transition to some new regime.
This paper is an attempt to show how the macroeconomic e¤ects of some of
the observed changes in nancial behavior can be analyzed using existing the-
oretical frameworks . The models in sections 4-5 di¤er along three dimensions:
(i) the role of labor constraints (mature vs dual economies), (ii) accumulation
regimes (Harrodian vs stagnationist specications), and (iii) the specication of
household behavior (elastic vs inelastic stock-ow ratios). All three dimensions
are important when it comes to evaluate the e¤ects of the behavioral changes
that have been associated with nancialization.
Looking rst at the third dimension, the comparative statics in the elastic
stock-ow case are reversed compared to the case with inelastic stock-ow ratios.
Phrased in this way, however, the result is not interesting since reversal of the
results formed the basis for the denition of elastic stock-ow ratios. More
interesting is the nding that all our specications fall into the category of
inelastic stock-ow ratios. We may not be able to conclude from this that all
reasonable specications are inelastic. We have shown, however, that a range
of empirically plausible specications will be stock-ow inelastic; it is striking,
in particular, that models like that of Lavoie-Godley which have been built up
from ow-ow relations also generate stock-ow ratios that are inelastic.
Assuming inelastic stock-ow ratio, some of the main results for the other two
dimensions are summarized in Table 5. Consider a change in new issue policies.29
A decrease in new issues will be expansionary in the mature Harrodian economy
as well in the stagnationist dual economy. Expansionary means di¤erent things
in the two regimes: the growth rate is exogenously given in the mature economy
and expansionary refers to an increase in the rate of employment; in the dual
economy, on the other hand, the labor supply is innitely elastic (and the rate
of employment ill-dened), and an expansionary e¤ect is one that raises the
growth rate.
28There is one possible exception: the quantitative e¤ect of the real interest rate on utiliza-
tion di¤ers substantially in the two systems. Our numerical exercises, however, show that the
di¤erence tends to decrease if we consider non-marginal, discrete changes in the interest rate.
29The e¤ects of changes in retention rates are a little less clear in that - essentially for
Marglin-Bhaduri reasons - the growth e¤ects are ambiguous in the stagnationist dual-economy
case.
24
The Harrodian dual economy produces the opposite result: a decrease in
new issues reduces the growth rate.30 Intuitively, the growth rate (along the
steady growth path) is constrained by the saving in the Harrodian dual economy,
and a decrease in new issues reduces saving and thereby the growth rate. This
argument is a straightforward generalization of what happens in the textbook
version of Harrods model. Once we move to a mature economy, however, the
growth rate of output and the rate of accumulation will adjust to the natural
rate. A decrease in new issues tends to reduce saving, and an increase in prots is
needed to compensate for this reduction and maintain the rate of accumulation
at the natural rate. An increase in protability, in turn, must be o¤set by a
rise in employment in order to keep the growth rate of output at the natural
rate. Basically, moving from a mature to an dual-economy setting turns an
expansionary change into a contractionary change.
Moving from a Harrodian to a stagnationist economy also tends to reverse
the comparative statics. This, again, generalizes results that are well-known
from comparisons of the textbook Harrod model with standard stagnationist
formulations (e.g. Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984)). The only di¤erence is
that here we have expanded the models to include nancial factors that are
usually left out.
These comparisons between mature and dual-economy versions of the Har-
rodian model and between Harrodian and stagnationist versions of the dual
economy provide some intuition for the similarity between the mature Harro-
dian economy and the stagnationist dual economy: these latter economies di¤er
in two dimensions and the two reversals of the comparative statics o¤set each
other.
Of course, the dependence of the comparative statics on the specication
of the model is not surprising. One contribution of this paper, however, is
to clarify the conditions under which the di¤erent results obtain. Moreover,
most studies of advanced capitalist economies by heterodox economists seem
to be informed by either a Harrodian mature-economy perspective or by the
stagnationist dual-economy framework (our own preference lies with the former,
but the majority view probably favors the latter). The two perspectives are
quite di¤erent, but our results in this paper show that when it comes to an
evaluation of the e¤ects of the changes in nancial behavior over the last 30
years, the qualitative conclusions are rather similar. A downward shift of the
accumulation will be contractionary; decreases in retained earnings, a decline
in new issues of equity and increased reliance on external nance, on the other
hand, will tend to be expansionary in both frameworks.
Financialization involves broader issues that go beyond the questions dis-
cussed in this paper. One set of issues concerns international capital ows and
the constraints implied by these ows on the policy options of nation states.
Leaving aside the international dimension, issues of power provide an another
example. It is often claimed that nancialization is associated with the increased
30The Harrodian dual economy could be split into two cases, depending on the sensitivity
of the growth function with respect to changes in the prot share. We focus on the high-
sensitivity case, cf. section 4.1.2.
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power of nancial institutions. Auerbach (1988), however, presents the case for
an alternative view:
The present relationships between banks and rms, far from sig-
nalling the growing dominance of nancial institutions represent a
precisely contrary development. They result from the e¤orts of -
nancial institutions to accommodate themselves to a far more inse-
cure environment, one made insecure by the activities of nancial
institutions in competition with each other and by the ever more
stringent demands made upon them by their clients, especially their
business customers. (p.)
Disregarding power issues, an increase in competition and insecurity may have
implications for nancial stability as well as for the time horizons used by both
rms and nancial institutions. A relatively recent but now largely forgotten
literature questioned the relative merits of competitive, market-based Anglo-
Saxon nancial systems compared to German-Japanese systems. The latter,
it was argued, might help to alleviate a short-termist bias (e.g. Cosh et al
1990). More generally, a competitive nancial system would not necessarily -
even if it were fully e¢ cient- produce good macroeconomic results if the in-
vestment in physical and/ or human capital gives rise to signicant externalities
(as suggested by traditional development theory, post Keynesians like Kaldor,
and recent endogenous growth theory). In the case of positive externalities,
articially lowinterest rates may be desirable (Auerbach and Skott 1992).31
One may note, nally, that concerns over the excesses and questionable
benets of the nancial system have been voiced before and that even the extent
of resources that are put into the nancial system may cause concern. Thus,
Tobin (1984; reprinted 1987) confessed
to an uneasy Physiocratic suspicion, perhaps unbecoming in an aca-
demic, that we are throwing more and more of our resources, includ-
ing the cream of our youth, into nancial activities remote from the
production of goods and services, into activities that generate high
private rewards disproportionate to their social productivity. (1987,
p. 294)
Tobins conclusion was motivated in part by the fact that 16 out of an elite
group of 46 executives whose earnings exceeded one million dollars in 1983 were
o¢ cers of nancial companies. He also noted that graduates from the School
of Organization and Management at Yale who took jobs in nance had starting
salaries four times the poverty threshold for four-person families, and observed
31The relatively strong German and Japanese economic performance during the Golden Age
could be explained, of course, by other factors, unrelated to the nancial systems. Likewise,
the relatively poor performance by the two economies in the more recent years may not reect
a need for reforms of the nancial and/or labor market systems, as claimed by OECD and
other international organisations. See Nakatani and Skott (2006) for discussion of the Japanese
case.
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that the average holding period for shares was only 19 months and that the
Department of Finance categories of Finance and Insurance generate 4.5-5 per
cent of GNP (1987, p. 282). These numbers seem almost quaint by todays
standards,32 and developments over the last 20 years can only reinforce ones
Physiocratic suspicions.
7 Appendix: The Numerical Results in Tables
1, 2 and 3
In 4.1.2, 4.2.2, and 5.2 we used numerical methods to examine the comparative
statics of two models: one with constant stock-ow ratios,  and , and the
other with Lavoie-Godley specications on consumption and portfolio choice
and induced variations in the stock-ows ratios. The analysis was conducted in
the context of Harrodian mature economies (4.1.2), Harrodian dual economies
(4.2.2), and Stagnationist dual economies (5.2) and the results summarized in
Tables 1,2 and 3. In this appendix, we present the procedure that was used to
nd the values of the derivatives of the endogenous variables with respect to
nancial and other parameters. We do this in the context of Stagnationist dual
economies (see Table 3 in 5.2) where the model with variable stock-ow ratios
is the same as the one in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002). The procedure in the
other cases is similar and, in fact, less complicated.
The stagnationist dual economies with the variable  and    Lavoie
and Godley (2001-2002)
g = sf (u  rm) +mg + xg (36)
g = 0 + 1sf ( u  rm)  2rm+ 3q + 4u (37)
u  g = a1fu  sf (u  rm)g+ a1
a2
 (38)
m = (1  0 + 1r   2re)q + 3fu  sf (u  rm)g (39)
where re = (1 sf )(u rm)+q m and  = g(q  m)  xg.
The symbols used here are the same as the ones in the main text of this paper.
The ination rate is assumed to be zero. (36) describes rmsnance constraint,
32 In 2005, among CEOs in the top 189 e¢ cient rms classied by Forbes, 164 earned more
than $2 million (or approximately $1 million in 1983 dollars) and 46 of them belonged to -
nancial companies (diversied nancials, banking, and insurance). The average compensation
of those 46 CEOs in nancial companies was $9.6 million or about 170 times the median U.S.
family income in 2004 (see The State of Working America 2006/2007 published by Economic
Policy Institute). In 2004, the average holding period for shares had dropped to 12.1 months
(NYSE Historical Statistics, http://www.nysedata.com). Finance and Insurance, as catego-
rized by the Department of Commerce, accounted for 5.5% of employee compensation, about
5% of the employed labor force, 7.5% of after-tax corporate prots, and about 3% of personal
consumption in 1983; in 2005 those corresponding gures were 7.6%, 4.3%, 11.1% and 5.9%
in 2005, respectively (calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Income and Product Account ).
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(37) is the investment function, (38) describes the equilibrium condition for the
product market where the right-hand side species households consumption
behavior as a function of household distributed income and capital gains. (39)
shows householdsdemand for money (portfolio choice). The following values
are used by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002).
0 = 0:0075 1 = 0:5 2 = 0:5 3 = 0:02 4 = 0:125
sf = 0:75 x = 0:05  = 0:2498
a1 = 0:8 a2 = 4:5
0 = 0:45 1 = 0:2 2 = 0:0133 3 = 0:0001 r = 0:0275
Given these parameter, (36)-(39) determines the steady-state values of u,
g, q and m. The system has multiple solutions due to nonlinearities of some
equations. The number of solutions is six but ve of them can be discarded on
economic grounds since at least one of the variables   including re   is negative.
The positive numerical solution is:
u = 0:188 g = 0:0545 q = 0:8789 m = 0:487 (40)
The partial derivatives of the solutions for u and g with respect to sf , x, r,
, and 0 are evaluated at (u, g, q, m). The obtained values were reported
in the third and fth columns of Table 3.
Using the denitions of  and , we obtain the following equilibrium values
for  and :
 =
q  m
u
= 2:07936  =
m
u
= 2:58914
Using these steady-state values of stock-ow ratios, we can transform the
variable  and  regime to the constant  and  regime by dropping the con-
sumption and portfolio choice functions.
Constant  and  regime
g = sf (u  rm) +mg + xg
g = 0 + 1sf ( u  rm)  2rm+ 3q + 4u
q = ( + )u
m = u
By construction, the above four equations must yield the same steady state
values as in (40). Then, the partial derivatives of the solutions for u and g with
respect to sf , x, r, , and 0, again, are evaluated at (u, g, q, m). The
second and forth columns of Table 3 report these values.
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Figure 1: The Retention Rate (1952-2005)
Notes: The retention rate adjusted for inflation = 1−{ Net Dividends ÷ (U.S.
Internal Funds + Net Dividends + Inflation rate × Net Liabilities)}. The infla-
tion rates are based on the CPI and Net Liabilities refer to nonfarm nonfinancial
corporate net liabilities. U.S internal funds = Profit (before taxes and after net
interest payments) − Taxes on corporate income − Net dividends + Consump-
tion of fixed capital + capital consumption adjustment.
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Table F.102 and Table B.102; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price
Index
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Figure 2: The Rate of Net Issues of Equities (1952-2005)
Notes: Net issues of nonfinancial corporate equities divided by the market value
of nonfinancial corporate equities outstanding
Sources: Calculated from Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States, Table F.213 and Table B.102
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Figure 3: The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment
(1952-2005)
Notes: Net issues of nonfinancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonfi-
nancial corporate (gross) fixed investment Quarterly data.
Sources: Calculated from Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States, Table F.213 and Table F.102
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Figure 4: The Ratio of Gross Debt to Capital: Nonfarm Nonfinancial
Corporations (1952-2005)
Notes: Gross debt = commercial paper + municipal securities + corporate
bonds + bank loans + other loans and advances + mortgages. Capital = re-
placement cost of structures + replacement cost of equipment and software.
Sources: Calculated from Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States, Table B.102
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Figure 5: Real Rates of Interest (1952-2006)
Notes: Nominal rates minus inflation rates using the CPI
Sources: Calculated from Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical
Release; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index
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Figure 6: The Ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Dis-
posable Personal Income (1952-2006)
Sources: Calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Income and Product Account, Table. 2.9
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Figure 7: The Ratio of Households’ Net Financial Worth to Disposable
Personal Income (1952-2006)
Notes: Net Financial Worth = Households’ Net Worth − Households’ Tangi-
ble Assets. In other words, the gap between two graphs shown in the figure
represents households’ tangible assets divided by disposable person income
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Table B.100
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Figure 8: The Ratio of Capital Gains on Financial Assets to Disposable
Personal Income: Households and Nonprofit Organizations (1952-
2005)
Notes: Capital Gains on Corporate Equities = (Holding gains on corporate eq-
uities − inflation rate using the CPI × corporate equities outstanding held by
households and nonprofit organizations)/ disposable personal income. Capital
Gains on Financial Assets =(Holding gains on all financial assets − inflation
rate using the CPI × all financial assets held by households and nonprofit or-
ganizations)/ disposable personal income.
Sources: Calculated from Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Table B.100 and Table R.100; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The
Consumer Price Index
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Table 1: Effects of changes in parameters on the profit share in a
Harrodian mature economy
Constant α and β
regime
Variable α and β
regime
The retention ratio -0.238 -0.238
Equity issues -0.386 -0.228
Real interest rate 2.589 2.575
Utilization -1.948 -1.634
Propensity to hold equity - 0.0717
Notes: Calculated based on parameter values in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002)
Table 2: Effects of changes in parameters on the accumulation rate in
a Harrodian dual economy
Constant α and β
regime
Variable α and β
regime
The retention ratio 0.073 0.037
Equity issues 0.118 0.021
Real interest rate -0.790 -0.396
Utilization 0.595 0.348
Profit share 0.305 0.154
Propensity to hold equity - -0.011
Notes: Calculated based on parameter values in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002)
Table 3: Effects of changes in parameters on the rates of utilization
and accumulation in a stagnationist dual economy
Utilization Accumulation
Regimes
Constant
α and β
regime
Variable
α and β
regime
Constant
α and β
regime
Variable
α and β
regime
The retention ratio -0.162 -0.186 -0.024 -0.028
Equity issues -0.342 -0.352 -0.085 -0.087
Real interest rate 1.055 0.197 -0.163 -0.327
Profit share -0.680 -0.780 -0.099 -0.118
Propensity to hold equity - 0.296 - 0.092
Notes: Calculated based on parameter values in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002)
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Table 4: Effects of Changes in Financial Variables on Stock-Flow Ra-
tios
sf x r
0.55 0.75 0.95 -0.05 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.0275 0.05
α 1.951 2.079 2.179 2.040 2.079 2.075 1.814 2.079 2.660
β 2.426 2.589 2.717 2.537 2.589 2.587 2.226 2.589 3.377
Notes: 0.75(sf ), 0.05(x), 0.0275(r), and the values for the parameters other than sf ,
x, and r are the same as those used in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002).
Table 5: The Effects of a Decrease in the Retention Ratio or the Rate
of Net Issues of Equities in Different Regimes
Mature Economies Dual Economies
Harrodian
Profit share: Increase
Employment: Increase
Growth: Decrease
Stagnationist
Utilization: Increase
Growth: Ambiguous when sf ↓
Growth: Increase when Nˆ ↓
10
